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Abstract
Scholars studying interactions among multiple communities have often
used the term legal pluralism to describe the inevitable intermingling of
normative systems that results from these interactions. In recent years,
a new application of pluralist insights has emerged in the international
and transnational realm. This review aims to survey and help define
this emerging field of global legal pluralism. I begin by briefly describing sites for pluralism research, both old and new. Then I discuss how
pluralism has come to be seen as an attractive analytical framework for
those interested in studying law on the world stage. Finally, I identify
advantages of a pluralist approach and respond to criticisms, and I suggest ways in which pluralism can help both in reframing old conceptual
debates and in generating useful normative insights for designing procedural mechanisms, institutions, and discursive practices for managing
hybrid legal/cultural spaces.
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INTRODUCTION
We live in a world of multiple, overlapping normative communities. Some of those
communities—such as federal, state, and municipal governments—are formal legal entities
often wielding coercive force in the service
of a bureaucratically administered set of legal
norms. Others, however, are nonstate communities created through religious, tribal, ethnic,
or other affiliations. Scholars studying interactions among these multiple communities have
often used the term legal pluralism to describe
the inevitable intermingling of these normative
systems.1
The study of plural normative systems has
arisen from a variety of different scholarly traditions. Perhaps the earliest analyses of the clashes
between state and nonstate authority were those
penned by lawyers, philosophers, and theologians interested in the respective realms of
church and state authority (see, e.g., Figgis
1913). Likewise, historians studying the regulatory role of nonstate entities such as jockey
clubs and stock exchanges noted that these entities often wield more power than does formal
state law (see, e.g., Maitland 1936). Anthropologists used the idea of legal pluralism to conceptualize the relationship between colonial and indigenous legal systems (see, e.g., Pospisil 1981).
And social norms theorists (see, e.g., Ellickson
1991) and scholars in behavioral law and economics (see, e.g., Jolls et al. 1998) have become
interested in varieties of informal law that often regulate behavior as much as or more than
official governmental pronouncements.
In recent years, a new application of pluralist
insights has emerged in the international and
transnational realm. This new legal pluralism

1

The history of legal pluralism is a matter of some debate. Some associate the term with legal anthropology (see,
e.g., Tamanaha 1993, Merry 1988), whereas others (see,
e.g., F. Benda-Beckmann 1997) trace the use of the term
to lawyers (Hooker 1975). Still others see legal pluralism as deriving from church/state conflicts-of-law analysis (see, e.g., Galanter 1981, p. 28). For discussions of the
history of legal pluralism, see Griffiths 1986; Merry 1988;
Vanderlinden 1989; de Sousa Santos 1987; Benda-Beckmann
1997; Tamanaha 1993, 2008.
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research was born in the decades following the
collapse of the bipolar Cold War order in 1989.
During this period, it became clear that a singleminded focus on state-to-state relations or universal overarching norms was inadequate to
describe the reality of the emerging global legal
system, with its web of jurisdictional assertions
by state, international, and nonstate normative communities (e.g., Teubner 1997). As one
commenter puts it:
The nation-state and the interstate system are
the central political forms of the capitalist
world system, and they will probably remain
so for the foreseeable future. What has happened, however, is that they have become an
inherently contested terrain, and this is the
central new fact on which the analysis must
focus: the state and the interstate system as
complex social fields in which state and nonstate, local and global social relations interact, merge and conflict in dynamic and even
volatile combinations (de Sousa Santos 2002,
p. 94).

Legal pluralism provided a useful alternative framework because pluralism had always
sought to identify hybrid legal spaces, where
multiple normative systems occupied the same
social field. And although pluralists had often
focused on clashes within one geographical
area—where formal bureaucracies encountered
indigenous ethnic, tribal, institutional, or religious norms—the pluralist framework proved
highly adaptive to analysis of the hybrid legal
spaces created by a different set of overlapping
jurisdictional assertions (state versus state, state
versus international body, state versus nonstate
entity) in the global arena.2
This review aims to survey and help define
this emerging field of global legal pluralism.

2

In that sense, we might more accurately refer to the global
legal system as a multiscalar legal system. For example,
Osofsky (2007) has argued that the term multiscalar more accurately captures the variety of normative communities with
input at different levels of the legal hierarchy than does the
word global.

Berman
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I begin by briefly describing sites for pluralism research, both old and new. Then I discuss
how pluralism has come to be seen as an attractive analytical framework for those interested
in studying law on the world stage. Finally, I
identify advantages of a pluralist approach and
respond to criticisms, and I suggest ways in
which pluralism can help both in reframing old
conceptual debates and in generating useful
normative insights for designing procedural
mechanisms, institutions, and discursive practices for managing hybrid legal/cultural spaces.

CHANGING SITES
OF LEGAL PLURALISM
As noted above, theorists of pluralism start
from the premise that people belong to (or
feel affiliated with) multiple groups and understand themselves to be bound by the norms
of these multiple groups. Such groups can,
of course, include familiar political affiliations
such as nation-states, counties, towns, and so
on. But many community affiliations, such as
those held by transnational or subnational ethnic groups, religious institutions, trade organizations, unions, Internet chat groups, and a
myriad of other “norm-generating communities” (Cover 1983, p. 43), may at various times
exert tremendous power over our actions even
though they are not part of an official statebased system. Indeed, as scholars of legal pluralism have long noted, “not all the phenomena
related to law and not all that are law-like have
their source in the government” (Moore 1986,
p. 15).
Just as importantly, legal pluralists have
studied those situations in which two or more
state and nonstate normative systems occupy
the same social field and must negotiate the
resulting hybrid legal space (see, e.g., Merry
1988, 2007; Moore 1973; Weisbrod 2002;
Engel 1980; Tamanaha 2000; Benda-Beckmann
2002; Benda-Beckmann 2001; Galanter 1981;
Griffiths 1986). Such spaces were, of course, the
norm before the rise of the modern state system.
For example, the Roman Empire allowed local
laws to remain in force, and the medieval period

in Europe likewise had at least three systems
of statutory law—Roman law, canon law, and
Germanic Lombard law—alongside statutes
of municipalities and independent states
(Ullmann 1969, p. 71). Combine this with a
robust set of legal regimes that depended on
personal religious, ethnic, or commercial affiliation (Morrall 1980), and one has a daunting
web of legal systems. Indeed, seen against this
backdrop, it is clear that legal pluralism was long
the obvious norm, not something that needed
to be “unearthed” by scholars.
The success of state-building and its
surrounding ideology in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries has undoubtedly
rendered legal pluralism less visible, although
it is perhaps no less vibrant. Thus, Eugen
Ehrlich’s classic depiction of “living law” in
rural Austria documented the ways in which
local customary law continued its influence
(or even dominance) despite sweeping claims
of state authority (Ehrlich 1936). Meanwhile,
canon law and other spiritual codes continued
to exist in uneasy relationship with the state
legal system (Weisbrod 1980, Galanter 1981).
In the twentieth century, anthropologically
oriented legal pluralists focused on the overlapping normative systems created during the process of colonization (Merry 1988, pp. 869–72).
Early studies of indigenous law among tribes
and villages in colonized societies noted the
simultaneous existence of both local law and
European law (Malinowski 1926). Indeed,
British colonial law actually incorporated
Hindu, Muslim, and Christian personal law
into its administrative framework (Merry 2007).
This early pluralist scholarship focused on the
hierarchical coexistence of what were imagined to be quite separate legal systems, layered
one on top of the other. Thus, for example,
when Leopold Pospisil (1981) documented the
way in which Kapauku Papuans responded to
the imposition of Dutch law, it was relatively
easy to identify the two distinct legal fields because Dutch law and Kapauku law were extremely different. As a result, Pospisil could
readily describe the degree of penetration of
Dutch law, the areas in which the Kapauku had
www.annualreviews.org • The New Legal Pluralism
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appropriated and transformed Dutch law, and
the areas in which negotiations between the two
legal systems formed part of a broader political
struggle. Despite the somewhat reductionist
cast of the model, these pioneering studies established the key insights of legal pluralism: a
recognition that multiple normative orders exist and a focus on the dialectical interaction
between and among these normative orders
(Merry 1988, p. 873).
In the 1970s and 1980s, anthropological
scholars of pluralism complicated the picture
in three significant ways. First, they questioned
the hierarchical model of one legal system simply dominating the other and instead argued
that plural systems are often semiautonomous,
operating within the framework of other legal
fields but not entirely governed by them (Moore
1973, Kidder 1979). As Sally Engle Merry recounts, this was an extraordinarily powerful
conceptual move because it placed “at the center of investigation the relationship between the
official legal system and other forms of ordering
that connect with but are in some ways separate
from and dependent on it” (Merry 1988, p. 873).
Second, scholars began to conceptualize the interaction between legal systems as bidirectional,
with each influencing (and helping to constitute) the other (Fitzpatrick 1984). This was a
distinct shift from the early studies, which had
tended only to investigate ways in which state
law penetrated and changed indigenous systems
and not the other way round. Third, scholars
defined the idea of a legal system sufficiently
broadly to include many types of nonofficial
normative ordering, and they therefore argued
that such legal subgroups operate not only in
colonial societies, but in advanced industrialized settings as well (Merry 1988, pp. 870–71).
Of course, finding nonstate forms of normative ordering is sometimes more difficult outside the colonial context because there is no
obvious indigenous system, and the less formal
ordering structures tend to “blend more readily into the landscape” (Merry 1988, p. 873).
Thus, pluralists argued that, in order to see
nonstate law, scholars would first need to reject what John Griffiths called “the ideology of
228

Berman

legal centralism,” the exclusive positivist focus
on state law and its system of lawyers, courts,
and prisons (Griffiths 1986, p. 2). Instead, pluralists turned to documenting “forms of social
regulation that draw on the symbols of the law,
to a greater or lesser extent, but that operate
in its shadows, its parking lots, and even down
the street in mediation offices” (Merry 1988,
p. 874).
Meanwhile, scholars drawing more from political theory than from anthropology have long
focused on the fact that, prior to the rise of the
state system, much lawmaking took place in autonomous institutions and within smaller units
such as cities and guilds, while large geographic
areas remained largely unregulated [Ehrlich
1936 (1962), von Gierke 1934, von Gierke &
Heiman 1977]. And, like the anthropologists,
these researchers observed a wide range of nonstate lawmaking even in modern nation-states:
in tribal or ethnic enclaves (Weyrauch & Bell
1993), religious organizations (Weisbrod 1980),
corporate bylaws, social customs (Fuller 1968),
private regulatory bodies, and various groups,
associations, and nonstate institutions (Laski
1919, Ellickson 1991, Macaulay 1963). As these
studies make clear, “private, closely knit, homogenous microsocieties can create their own
norms that at times trump state law and at
other times fill lacuna[e] in state regulation,
but nonetheless operate autonomously” (Levit
2005, p. 184).
More recently, a new group of legal pluralists has emerged under the rubric of social
norms theory. Interestingly, however, these
scholars rarely refer to the anthropologists
and political theorists who have long explored
pluralism, perhaps because social norms theory
has emerged as a branch of behavioral law and
economics. The study of social norms, in its
broadest formulation, focuses on the variety of
“rules and standards that define the limits of
acceptable behavior”; such social norms “may
be the product of custom and usage, organizational affiliations, consensual undertakings and
individual conscience” ( Jones 1994, p. 545). In
addition, “norm entrepreneurs,” defined as individuals or groups that try to influence popular
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opinion in order to inculcate a social norm,
may consciously try to mobilize social pressure
to sustain or create social norms (Nadelmann
1990, Finnemore & Sikkink 1998). And while
some pluralists think that this broader category
of social norms dilutes legal pluralism’s historic
focus on more stable religious, ethnic, or tribal
groupings (Tamanaha 1993, Dane 1991), social
norms theory has the benefit of including
larger transnational communities that may
be based on long-term rhetorical persuasion
rather than on face-to-face interaction. Indeed, social norms theory tends to emphasize
the process whereby norms are internalized
through guilt, self-bereavement, a sense of
duty, and a desire for esteem, or simply by
slowly altering categories of thought and the
set of taken-for-granted ideas that constitute
one’s sense of the way things are.3
In part because legal pluralists of all stripes
have seen themselves in opposition to so-called
legal centralists, who focus on formal state law,
there has historically been little space within
the pluralist literature for examining state-tostate relations. Yet jurisdictional overlap of a
sort that is very familiar to scholars of pluralism is now a staple of the global legal arena.
The growth of global communications technologies, the rise of multinational corporate entities with no significant territorial center of
gravity, and the mobility of capital and people across borders mean that many jurisdictions
will feel effects of activities around the globe,
which will inevitably lead to multiple assertions
of legal authority over the same act, without regard to territorial location. In addition, nationstates must also often share legal authority with
one or more international and regional courts,
tribunals, and regulatory entities. Indeed, the
Project on International Courts and Tribunals
(http://www.pict-pcti.org) has identified approximately 125 international institutions, all
issuing decisions that have some effect on state

3

See studies of legal consciousness (e.g., Ewick & Silbey
1998) and of the way in which legal consciousness research
can inform our understanding of how international law can
be effective even without coercive sanctions (Berman 2006).

legal authority, although those effects are sometimes deemed binding, are sometimes considered merely persuasive, and often fall somewhere between the two. Finally, nonstate legal
(or quasi-legal) norms continue to add to the
pluralism of the global arena. Given increased
migration and global communication, it is not
surprising that people feel ties to, and act based
on affiliations with, multiple communities in
addition to their territorial ones. Such communities may be ethnic, religious, or epistemic,
transnational, subnational, or international, and
the norms asserted by such communities frequently challenge territorially based authority.
These nonstate legal regimes often influence
(or are incorporated into) state or international
regimes (Levit 2005, Weisbrod 1999).
Interestingly, for a long time social scientists paid little attention to these various forms
of global legal pluralism, perhaps for the same
reason as international relations realists: They
did not see international law as “real” law worthy of study. Thus, just as realist scholars treated
international law merely as an epiphenomenon
of political power, social scientists—with some
exceptions, of course—saw no formal mechanisms of coercive enforcement and therefore
tended to train their gaze on domestic imposition of (and resistance to) normative orders.
In addition, some social scientists may have reflexively resisted the claims of international law,
viewing such claims as hegemonic impositions
of Western norms onto indigenous communities. Accordingly, global legal pluralism has attracted legal scholars at least as much as it has
attracted social scientists. It is to this new body
of scholarship that this review now turns.

THE RISE OF GLOBAL
LEGAL PLURALISM
Those who study international public and
private law have not, historically, paid much
attention to legal pluralism [although there
have certainly been exceptions (e.g., Kingsbury
1998)]. This is because the emphasis traditionally has been on state-to-state relations. Indeed,
international law has generally emphasized
www.annualreviews.org • The New Legal Pluralism

229

ANRV392-LS05-11

ARI

24 September 2009

19:10

bilateral and multilateral treaties between and
among states, the activities of the United
Nations, the pronouncements of international
tribunals, and (somewhat more controversially)
the norms that states had obeyed long enough
that such norms could be deemed customary.
This was a legal universe with two guiding principles. First, law was deemed to reside only
in the acts of official, state-sanctioned entities.
Second, law was seen as an exclusive function
of state sovereignty.4
Both principles, however, have eroded over
time. The rise of a conception of international
human rights in the post–World War II era
transformed individuals into international
law stakeholders possessing their own entitlements against the state. But even apart from
individual empowerment, scholars have more
recently come to recognize the myriad ways
in which the prerogatives of nation-states are
cabined by transnational and international
actors. Whereas F.A. Mann (1984, p. 20) could
confidently state in 1984 that “laws extend so
far as, but no further than the sovereignty of
the State which puts them into force,” many
international law scholars have argued, at least
since the end of the Cold War, that such a narrow view of how law operates transnationally is
inadequate. Thus, the past 20 years have seen

increasing attention to the important—though
sometimes inchoate—processes of international norm development (Berman 2005,
pp. 488–89). Such processes inevitably lead
scholars to consider overlapping transnational
jurisdictional assertions by nation-states, as
well as norms articulated by international bodies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
multinational corporations and industry
groups, indigenous communities, transnational
terrorists, networks of activists, and so on.
In this consideration, U.S. scholars of global
legal pluralism have hearkened back to the insights of Robert Cover. Like other legal pluralists, Cover refused to privilege the legitimacy
or authority of state lawmaking as compared to
other normative communities. Thus, he argued
that “all collective behavior entailing systematic
understandings of our commitments to future
worlds [can lay] equal claim to the word ‘law’”
(Cover 1992, p. 176). This formulation deliberately denies the nation-state any special status
as a lawgiver. According to Cover, although
the status of such “official” behavior and
“official” norms is not denied the dignity of
“law” . . . it must share the dignity with thousands of other social understandings. In each
case the question of what is law and for whom
is a question of fact about what certain communities believe and with what commitments

4

Of course, this is an oversimplified vision of international
law. Nonstate sources—including the idea of natural law
itself—have long played a key role in the development of international legal principles. Indeed, prior to Bentham, these
nonstate sources, including the universal common law of jus
gentium, were arguably far more important than the norms
generated by states (Koh 1997, p. 2604). For example, during
the Middle Ages, treaties—which are usually viewed today as
the positive law of state interaction—were deemed subject to
the overarching jurisdiction of the church because they were
sealed by oaths. Even later, no less a theorist than Vattel,
while repudiating natural law’s religious underpinnings, continued to ground international law in the laws of nature (de
Vattel 1797). In the nineteenth century, although positivism
reigned both in the United States and abroad, transnational
nonstate actors nevertheless played important roles. Natural
law principles continue to undergird many international law
doctrines, such as jus cogens norms ( Janis 2003). Thus, the
focus on nonstate norm generation is not a new phenomenon,
but I argue that it is reemerging as a significant branch of
scholarship within international law and that it may even call
for a reclassification of international law itself.
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to those beliefs (Cover 1992, p. 176).

Of course, Cover was not blind to the fact
that some lawgivers wield the power of coercive violence. Indeed, Cover frequently sought
to make judges more aware of the violence
they do, going so far as to say that judges
are inevitably “people of violence.” Cover argued that “[b]ecause of the violence they command, judges characteristically do not create
law, but kill it. Theirs is the jurispathic office”
(Cover 1983, p. 53). In this vision, judges use
the force of the state to crush competing legal
conceptions pushed by alternative normative
communities.
At the same time, Cover’s vision opens up the
possibility of creative alternatives because he
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located within legal forms a space for resistance,
contestation, and adaptation. For example, in
his one foray into international law, he acknowledged that the Nuremberg War Crimes trials
were a form of victors’ justice (Cover 1992,
pp. 196–97). However, he then argued that,
once the legal form of having trials for crimes
against humanity was created, this form could
be appropriated by other normative communities and used against the powerful. Thus, he described the trial of the Vietnam War organized
by Bertrand Russell and Jean-Paul Sartre as an
attempt to appropriate the Nuremberg form.
Moreover, Cover acknowledged the impact of
legal enunciations, whether state based or not,
on legal consciousness. He therefore defended
the Nuremberg trials based on “the capacity of
the event to project a new legal meaning into the
future.” Such legal meaning was then available
for others to use and build upon in subsequent
iterations.
Finally, Cover identified jurisdictional politics as an important locus for the clash of normative visions. According to Cover, law is “a bridge
in normative space” that “connects the worldthat-is . . . with worlds-that-might-be” (Cover
1992, p. 176). Indeed, he made clear that it is
in the assertion of jurisdiction itself that these
norm-generating communities seize the language of law and articulate visions of future
worlds. If jurisdiction is, literally, the ability to
speak as a community, then, he suggested, we
can begin to develop a “natural law of jurisdiction” (Cover 1983, p. 58), in which communities claim the authority to use the language of
law based on a right or entitlement that is separate from the particular sovereignties of the
present moment. Such jurisdictional assertions
are significant because, even though they lack
coercive power, they open a space for the articulation of legal norms that are often subsequently incorporated into official legal regimes.
Indeed, once we recognize that the state does
not hold a monopoly on the articulation and
exercise of legal norms, then we can see law as
a terrain of engagement, where various communities debate different visions of alternative
futures.

The importance of multiple jurisdictional
assertions is a key part of Cover’s (1981) essay, “The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy.”
Although this essay was focused on the variety
of official law pronouncers in the U.S. federal
system, Cover celebrated the benefits that accrue from having multiple overlapping jurisdictional assertions. Such benefits included greater
possibility for error correction, a more robust
field for norm articulation, and a larger space
for creative innovation. And though Cover acknowledged that it might seem perverse “to
seek out a messy and indeterminate end to conflicts which may be tied neatly together by a
single authoritative verdict,” he nevertheless argued that we should “embrace” a system “that
permits tensions and conflicts of the social order” to be played out in the jurisdictional structure of the system (1981, p. 682). Thus, Cover’s
pluralism, though here focused on U.S. federalism, can be said to embrace the creative possibilities inherent in multiple overlapping jurisdictions asserted by both state and nonstate
entities in whatever context they arise.
Although Cover, like other legal pluralists,
focused primarily on domestic legal processes,
his insights have proved to be inspirational to
succeeding generations of scholars considering
the role that plural sources of norms can play
in the international and transnational sphere.
For example, in the 1990s Harold Hongju Koh
tackled the perennial question of why states
obey international law even in the absence (usually) of obviously coercive sanctions. In a series of influential articles, Koh (1996, 1997,
1998, 1999) identified what he called “transnational legal process,” which emphasizes iterative practices of states that are spurred by norm
entrepreneurs both inside and outside governments and that become habitual over time. Significantly, the major innovation of Koh’s vision
was that it wedded a process-based focus on
norm articulation to a Cover-like embrace of
the potentially jurisgenerative power of international and transnational legal norms. Cover
had defined jurisgenerative processes as those
in which interpretive “communities do create
law and do give meaning to law through their
www.annualreviews.org • The New Legal Pluralism
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narratives and precepts” (Cover 1983, p. 40).
Koh invoked this jurisgenerative role of international and transnational law in multiple articles. Thus, by deploying Cover’s pluralism,
transnational legal process emerged as a way
to explain the impact of international law even
when it was not backed by obvious coercive
power.
Building further on Koh’s approach has required scholars to delve deeper into legal pluralism and to take its insights even more firmly
to heart. Although Koh’s transnational legal
process framework ushered in an influential
perspective on international law, that framework is now being expanded in significant ways,
reflecting an ever-deepening pluralist orientation. In the following subsections, I briefly describe some of the sites of study for a pluralist approach. This new scholarship, as I have
argued elsewhere (Berman 2005), begins to
turn the focus of inquiry from international
law—traditionally conceived as state-to-state
interactions—to law and globalization, a more
multivalent study.

The Multidirectional Interaction
of Local, National, and International
Norms
Both international law triumphalists and international law critics tend to share a top-down vision of international law. From this perspective,
international norms are imposed on nationstates or local actors, and the challenge (or the
fear) is the degree to which various populations imbibe the international norm. Even the
transnational legal process paradigm, although
it acknowledges an important role for nonstate
norm entrepreneurs, tends to focus ultimately
on the ways in which state actors internalize international norms, thereby emphasizing a
top-down model.
This top-down conception, however,
captures only part of the picture of how law
operates globally. After all, nation-state bureaucracies may imbibe institutional roles from one
another (Goodman & Jinks 2004). Moreover,
the so-called international community is not
232
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a monolithic entity, but rather a collection of
interests. Similarly, local norms are always contested, even within their communities (Sunder
2003), and local actors may well invoke nonlocal norms for strategic or political advantage
(Merry & Stern 2005) or “vernacularize” them
for a local audience (Merry & Goodale 2007). In
addition, local actors deploying or resisting national or international norms may well subvert
or transform them, and the resulting transformation is sure to seep back up so that, over
time, the international norm is transformed as
well (Rajagopal 2003, 2005; de Sousa Santos &
Rodriguez Garavito 2005). And on and on.
Thus, the local, the national, and the international are all constantly shifting concepts
(Benhabib 2008, p. 74). Accordingly, scholars of
global legal pluralism study the back and forth
of the feedback loops: How do local actors access the power of NGOs? How do global scripts
get replayed in local contexts? How are governmental and foundation funding decisions
made, and how do funding priorities affect the
projects undertaken around the world? How
are global norms deployed locally? Are local
concerns strategically transformed by elected
elites at the national and international level?
How do UN bureaucracies foster the creation
of a cadre of local actors who are more aligned
with other UN officials than with those in their
home countries? What role do Western universities play in the creation of national and local
norms given that many local elites are educated
abroad? Only through a more fine-grained, nuanced understanding of the way legal norms
are passed on from one group to the other and
then transformed before spreading back again
can scholars begin to approach the multifaceted
ways in which legal norms develop.

Nonstate International Lawmaking
A more pluralist account of international law
also recognizes the wide variety of nonstate
actors engaged in the establishment of norms
that operate internationally and transnationally. For example, as Levit (2005) has noted in
the context of transnational trade finance, rules
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embodied in various informal standards, procedures, and agreements that bind banks and
credit agencies have the force of law even without any official governmental involvement. She
also points out that more formal lawmaking
institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) have, over time, appropriated
these norms into their official legal instruments.
In some circumstances, official legal actors
may delegate lawmaking authority to nonstate
entities or recognize the efficacy of nonstate
norms. For example, commercial litigation,
particularly in the international arena, increasingly takes place before nonstate arbitral panels
(Dezalay & Garth 1996). Likewise, nongovernmental standard-setting bodies, from Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. (which tests electrical
and other equipment) to the Motion Picture Association of America (which rates the content of
films) to the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (which administers the
Internet domain-name system), construct detailed normative systems with the effect of law.
Meanwhile, regulation of much financial market activity is left to private authorities such as
stock markets or trade associations like the National Association of Securities Dealers. These
international trade-association groups and their
private standard-setting bodies wield tremendous influence in creating voluntary standards
that become industry norms.
The proliferation of international tribunals
also, of course, creates the opportunity for plural norm creation. Thus, commentators have
noted the increasing role of WTO appellate tribunals in creating an international common law
of trade (Bhala 1998/1999), as well as the new
prominence of other specialized trade courts
developed in connection with free trade agreements (Ahdieh 2004). Moreover, although only
state parties can be formal litigants in the WTO
dispute-resolution process, free trade panels
permit private parties to challenge domestic
governmental regulations directly. In addition, a number of international conventions,
although signed by state parties, empower private actors to develop international norms. For
example, the Convention on the Settlement of

Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States permits private creditors
to sue debtor states in an international forum.
Similarly, the Convention on the International
Sale of Goods allows transacting parties to
opt out of any nation-state law and instead to
choose a sort of merchant law reminiscent of
the feudal era’s lex mercatoria (Gillette 2004).
Accordingly, a more comprehensive conception of the global legal order must attend to
the jurisdictional assertions and articulations of
legal (or quasi-legal) norms by nonsovereign
communities. Such jurisdictional assertions are
significant because, although they often lack
state-backed coercive power, they may in fact
carry real coercive force, and even when they do
not have any coercive force at all they may open
a space for the articulation of legal norms that
are often subsequently incorporated into official legal regimes. Thus, as Cover recognized,
law is not simply a mechanism of state control;
it is also a locus for various communities to advance alternative visions.

Dialectical Legal Interactions
As noted above, some scholars of international
law fail to find real law there because they
are looking for hierarchically based commands
backed by coercive power. In contrast, those
who take a pluralist approach understand that
interactions among various tribunals and regulatory authorities are more likely to take on a
dialectical quality that is neither the direct hierarchical review traditionally undertaken by appellate courts nor simply the dialogue that often
occurs under the doctrine of comity (Ahdieh
2004). In the international context, for example, we may see treaty-based courts exert an
important influence even as national courts retain formal independence, much as U.S. federal courts exercising habeas corpus jurisdiction
may well influence state court interpretations of
U.S. constitutional norms in criminal cases. In
turn, the decisions of national courts may also
come to influence international tribunals.
This dialectical relationship, if it emerges,
will exist without an official hierarchical
www.annualreviews.org • The New Legal Pluralism

233

ANRV392-LS05-11

ARI

24 September 2009

19:10

relationship based on coercive power. For example, in 2003 a North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) panel determined that
a particular Mississippi state appellate procedure violated international norms of due process and constituted an unfair trade practice.
In future Mississippi cases concerning the same
procedure, the state court will therefore face a
form of choice-of-law decision, with the state
court determining what weight to give the
NAFTA tribunal action. Likewise, within the
European Union, we see a similar dialectical
dance between the European Court of Human Rights and the various state constitutional
courts (Krisch 2008). And of course court-tocourt dialectical regulation is only the tip of
the iceberg, as transnational and intersystemic
regulation (both within and among states) takes
on a similar dialectical dynamic (Ahdieh 2006,
Burke-White 2004).

Conflicts of Law
More than 15 years ago, German theorist
Gunther Teubner (1993) called for the creation
of an “intersystemic conflicts law” derived not
just from collisions among the nation-states of
public international law, but from what he described as “collisions between distinct global
social sectors.” Since then, the web of intersystemic lawmaking Teubner described has only
grown more complex. In a world of extraterritorial and nonterritorial effects, local populations increasingly attempt to assert dominion
(or, in legal terms, jurisdiction) over territorially distant acts or actors. At the same time,
nonlocal actors invoke the jurisdiction of international or transnational tribunals in order
to avoid the consequences of local legal proceedings. In both circumstances, battles over
globalization are often fought on the terrain of
conflict of laws.
For example, online communication creates
the possibility (and perhaps even the likelihood) that content posted online by a person
in one physical location will violate the law in
some other physical location. This poses an
inevitable problem of extraterritoriality. Will
234
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the person who posts the content be required
to conform her activities to the norms of the
most restrictive community of readers? Alternatively, will the restrictive community of
readers, which has adopted a norm regarding
Internet content, be subjected to the proscribed
material regardless of its wishes? The answers
to these questions depend both on whether the
community of readers asserts the jurisdictional
authority to impose its norms on the foreign
content provider and whether the home country of the content provider chooses to recognize the norms imposed (Berman 2002). Crossborder environmental (Sands 2001, Osofsky
2007, Osofsky & Levit 2008) and trade regulation (Ahdieh 2004, Trujillo 2007) raises similar
issues.
Just as local communities affected by distant corporate activity may seek to assert jurisdiction over those allegedly causing the harm,
corporations may seek to avoid local jurisdiction by invoking the competing jurisdiction of
international tribunals. For example, as noted
above, under NAFTA and other similar agreements special panels can pass judgment on the
due process provided in local legal proceedings. Although these panels cannot directly review or overturn local judgments, they can levy
fines against the federal government signatories to the agreement, thereby undermining
the impact of the local judgment. Meanwhile,
in the realm of human rights, criminal defendants convicted in state courts in the United
States have proceeded (through their governments) to the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) to argue that they were denied the right
to contact their consulate, as required by treaty.
Again, although the ICJ judgments are technically unenforceable in the United States, at
least one state court followed the ICJ’s command anyway (Berman 2008). In a similar vein,
the very creation of a commission of inquiry
(Dickinson 2003) or the mere assertion of jurisdiction in one place over an alleged human
rights abuser elsewhere (Burke-White 2008)
can spur activity in the abuser’s home community, thereby sparking greater possibilities for
enforcement.
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In each of these circumstances, we see a dialectical dance arising from the fact that multiple communities are asserting jurisdiction over
the same activities. Such dances are likely to
become the norm as a variety of communities
claim an interest in regulating distant behavior
having extraterritorial effects or as parties claim
a community affiliation beyond the local. Thus,
there is an increasing global instantiation of the
jurisdictional redundancy Cover celebrated in
the domestic realm (Resnik 2006; 2008a,b,c).
All of these extraterritorial jurisdictional assertions inevitably increase the pressure on
choice-of-law doctrines as well. For example,
Chander (2001) has observed that many members of the Indian-American diaspora purchase
bonds issued by their home country. The purchase of these bonds obviously reflects the enduring tie these members of the Indian diaspora have to their homeland. Thus, one might
argue that, even when the bonds are purchased
in the United States, the purchases should be
governed by Indian, rather than U.S., securities
laws because the bond sale reflects a substantive (and voluntary) tie between the purchasers
and the Indian government. Likewise, multinational copyright disputes could be adjudicated
through the application of hybrid legal norms
drawn from a variety of relevant countries
(Dinwoodie 2000).
Meanwhile, a fluidly plural system makes it
more likely that authorities in one territorial
location will be asked to enforce a judgment
issued elsewhere. Or, particularly in multiethnic states, there may be a variety of conflicting adjudicatory authorities within the same
state, and the question becomes whether the
different authorities will at least recognize one
another’s judgments, even without recognizing
each other’s legitimacy (Baylis 2007). The criteria for making these sorts of enforcement decisions are uncertain and likely to change over
time. Within the United States, the Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause (Article IV,
Section 1) requires that a valid judgment issued by one state be enforced by every other
state even if the judgment being enforced would
be illegal if issued by the rendering state. Of

course, within a single, relatively homogenous
country, the idea of one state enforcing another
state’s judgment does not seem so significant because the variations from state to state are likely
to be relatively minor. In contrast, transnational
recognition of judgments is more controversial.
Yet, although the decision to enforce a
judgment surely is less automatic when the
judgment at issue is rendered by a foreign
(or international) tribunal, many of the same
principles are still relevant. Thus, courts could
acknowledge the importance of participating
in an interlocking legal system, where litigants
cannot simply avoid unpleasant judgments by
relocating. Moreover, deference to other lawmaking bodies has long-term reciprocal benefits. Particularly when the parties have no significant affiliation with the enforcing community,
there is little reason for a court to insist on
following domestic public policies in the face of
such competing conflicts values and therefore
deny enforcement. And although the doctrine
of comity has long been used to capture these
values, thinking of the issue as a matter of judgment recognition (instead of comity) may discourage courts from reflexively invoking public
policy to avoid unpopular foreign judgments.
In any event, it is clear that, in a world of
plural normative assertions, one crucial question will be whether a community’s articulation
of norms is sufficiently persuasive to convince
those wielding coercive power to enforce such
norms. For example, if a community purports
to adjudicate a dispute, its judgment is not necessarily self-executing, particularly if the losing
party is territorially distant. Thus, some entity with police power must enforce the judgment. Accordingly, the question becomes not
whether a community can assert jurisdiction,
but whether other communities are willing to
give deference to the judgment rendered and
enforce it as if it were their own. Indeed, as
Cover himself acknowledged (1992, p. 187),
even at the moment that a community daringly
asserts its own legal jurisdiction, it is immediately forced to acknowledge that its invention
is limited by the willingness of others to accept
the judgment as normatively legitimate. Such
www.annualreviews.org • The New Legal Pluralism
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jurisdictional politics form an inevitable part of
a global system less defined by Westphalian delineations of authority based on clear territorial
boundaries.

The Disaggregation of the State
One of the reasons that it is so important to
conceive of law beyond the state level is that the
state itself is increasingly delegating authority
to private actors who exist in a shadowy world
of quasi-public/quasi-private authority. The issue of private parties exercising forms of governmentally authorized power has long been a
subject of U.S. constitutional law jurisprudence
and scholarship, but international law scholars are only just beginning to consider such issues. Thus, for example, Singer (2003) notes
that many military activities—including combat, surveillance, training, and interrogation
functions—are increasingly being contracted
out to private companies. Yet both domestic and
international accountability mechanisms have
historically been premised on such roles being played by governmental actors. Meanwhile,
the literature on privatization in the domestic
context often focuses on the U.S. constitutional
doctrines of “state action” or nondelegation of
congressional authority to administrative agencies. Neither of these analytical frameworks is
precisely applicable to the international context
(Dickinson 2010). Likewise, studies of transnational regulatory networks, intersystemic regulation, and the role of NGOs and industry
standards in shaping norms reflect the growing
disaggregation of state-based governance models. Thus, over the coming decades, a pluralist approach to international law will undoubtedly explore the many ramifications of this new
trend in governance.
Obviously, this quick survey does not even
begin to describe the range of inquiries opened
up, or illuminated, by a global legal pluralist framework. But perhaps most fundamentally, no matter what the particular object of
study may be, a pluralist account encourages a
more microempirical analysis of how transnational, international, and nonstate norms are
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articulated, deployed, changed, and resisted in
thousands of different local settings. Such studies focus on the extent to which such norms have
real impact on the ground. Therefore, a pluralist approach provides an important alternative
both to traditional doctrinal international law
and to rational choice and realist models of law’s
impact.

ADVANTAGES OF A PLURALIST
APPROACH AND RESPONSES
TO CRITICISMS
As discussed above, legal pluralism can help
international law find a more comprehensive
framework for conceptualizing the clash of
normative communities in the modern world.
Consider, for example, Sally Falk Moore’s idea
of the “semiautonomous social field,” which she
describes as one that
can generate rules and customs and symbols
internally, but that . . . is also vulnerable to
rules and decisions and other forces emanating from the larger world by which it is surrounded. The semiautonomous social field has
rule-making capacities, and the means to induce or coerce compliance; but it is simultaneously set in a larger social matrix which can,
and does, affect and invade it, sometimes at
the invitation of persons inside it, sometimes
at its own instance (Moore 1973, p. 720).

Notice that, following Moore’s idea, we can
conceive of a legal system as both autonomous
and permeable; outside norms affect the system
but do not dominate it fully. The framework
thus captures a dialectical and iterative interplay that we see among normative communities
in the international system, an interplay that
rigidly territorialist or positivist visions of legal
authority do not address.
Even more fundamentally, legal pluralists
have observed ways in which state law and other
normative orders mutually constitute one another. Thus, for example, the family and its legal order are obviously shaped by the state, but
the state in turn is shaped by the family and its
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legal order because each is part of the other
(Fitzpatrick 1984). And although pluralists
historically focused primarily on the state’s relationship to internal nonstate law within its borders, the framework is equally cogent in studying external dialectical interactions both with
other states and with various international or
transnational legal communities. Indeed, recent
international law scholarship emphasizes ways
in which states are changed simply by the fact
that they are part of an international network of
states (Goodman & Jinks 2004). Such an insight
echoes pluralism’s coconstitutive approach.
In addition, pluralism offers possibilities for
thinking about spaces of resistance to state law.
Indeed, by recognizing at least the semiautonomy of conflicting legal orders, pluralism necessarily examines limits to the ideological power
of state legal pronouncements. Pluralists do not
deny the significance of state law and coercive
power, of course, but they do try to identify
places where state law does not penetrate or
penetrates only partially, and where alternative
forms of ordering persist to provide opportunities for resistance, contestation, and alternative
vision. Such an approach encourages international law scholars to treat the multiple sites of
normative authority in the global legal system as
a set of inevitable interactions to be managed,
not as a problem to be solved. And again, although pluralists historically studied only nonstate alternatives to state power, the international law context adds state-to-state relations
and their overlapping jurisdictional assertions
to the mix, providing yet another set of possible alternative normative communities to the
web of pluralist interactions.
Finally, pluralism frees scholars from needing an essentialist definition of law. For example, with legal pluralism as our analytical
frame, we can get beyond the endless debates
both about whether international law is law at
all and whether it has any real effect. Indeed,
the whole debate about law versus nonlaw is
largely irrelevant in a pluralist context because
the key questions involve the normative commitments of a community and the interactions
among normative orders that give rise to such

commitments, not their formal status. Thus, we
can resist positivist reductionism and set nationstate law within a broader context. Moreover, an
emphasis on social norms allows us to see more
readily how nonstate legal orders can have significant impact on the world. After all, if a statement of norms is ultimately internalized by a
population, that statement will have important
binding force, often even more so than a formal law backed by state sanction. Accordingly,
by taking pluralism seriously we can more easily
understand how the contest over norms creates
legitimacy over time, and we can put to rest
the idea that norms not associated with nationstates necessarily lack significance. Indeed, legal pluralists refuse to focus solely on who has
the formal authority to articulate norms or the
coercive power to enforce them. Instead, they
aim to study empirically which statements of
authority tend to be treated as binding in actual
practice and by whom.
Of course, there are differences among
forms of ordering, particularly given that some
legal forms have coercive state power behind
them while others do not. Also, disparities in
political and economic power strongly affect
how much influence any particular normative
community is likely to have. But even those
differences are not completely determinative.
After all, even if formal legal institutions have a
near monopoly on legitimate use of force, there
are many other forms of effective coercion and
inducement wielded by nonstate actors (Weber
1954). In addition, official legal rules that are
contrary to prevailing customary or community
norms often have little or no real-world effect,
at least not without the willingness (or capability) of coercive bodies to exercise sustained
force to impose such rules. Thus, obedience to
norms frequently reflects sociopolitical reality
more than the status of those norms as law. As a
result, “[d]efining the essence of law or custom
is less valuable than situating these concepts in
particular sets of relations between particular
legal orders, in particular historical contexts”
(Merry 1988, p. 889).
In any event, the important point is that
scholars studying the global legal scene need
www.annualreviews.org • The New Legal Pluralism
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not rehash long and ultimately fruitless debates (both in philosophy and in anthropology) about what constitutes law. They can instead take a nonessentialist position: treating as
law that which people view as law (Tamanaha
2000). This formulation turns the what-is-law
question into a descriptive inquiry concerning which social norms are recognized as authoritative sources of obligation and by whom.
Indeed, the question of what constitutes law is
itself revealed as a terrain of contestation among
multiple actors (Nader 2002).
Interestingly, global legal pluralism has been
criticized both by committed international law
proponents and by committed nation-state
sovereigntists. For those who have worked for
decades trying to convince governments, policy
makers, and populations to treat international
legal rules as authoritative and hierarchically
binding positive law, a pluralist framework
may seem to undermine their efforts (e.g.,
Koskenniemi 2006). Even those less committed
to international norms and institutions as a
philosophical matter may nevertheless seek
universal harmonization of norms in order to
simplify the seeming chaos of pluralism (e.g.,
Bhagwati 1996, pp. 32–34). Sovereigntists, for
their part, seek to draw clear lines of demarcation between spheres of authority and worry,
on both a practical and a philosophical level,
about the influence of norms not adopted by a
governmental unit within a polity [e.g., Posner
& Sunstein 2006, p. 133 (citing articles)].
In response to these concerns, pluralists offer answers that are both descriptive and normative. As a descriptive matter, pluralists argue
that legal fragmentation and the contest among
plural sources of norms are not realities that a
hierarchically situated actor can choose to permit or reject; pluralism is simply a fact because
multiple communities assert norms that have
impact. Thus, regardless of what international
law proponents say, there will always be resistance to universal norms because there are
multiple communities with different normative
commitments. As a result, although harmonization regimes are certainly important and influential, they will never occupy the entire field.
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Likewise, a sovereigntist rejection of foreign,
international, or nonstate influence and authority is unlikely to be fully successful in a world
of global interaction and cross-border activity.
Indeed, seen from the point of view of U.S. historical practice, “sovereigntists have a dismal
track record, in that American law is constantly
being made and remade through exchanges,
some frank and some implicit, with normative
views from abroad. Laws, like people, migrate.
Legal borders, like physical ones, are permeable, and seepage is everywhere” (Resnik 2008a,
pp. 63–64). Accordingly, instead of bemoaning
either the fragmentation of law or the messiness of jurisdictional overlaps, we should accept them as necessary consequences of the fact
that communities can be neither homogenized
into a single universal collective nor hermetically sealed off from one another.
More normatively, we can go further and
consider the possibility that this jurisdictional
messiness may, in the end, provide important systemic benefits by fostering dialogue
among multiple constituencies, authorities, levels of government, and nonstate communities (Berman 2007). In addition, jurisdictional
redundancy allows alternative ports of entry
for strategic actors who might otherwise be
silenced. Thus, following the insights of legal pluralism, we may view normative conflict
among multiple, overlapping legal systems as
not only unavoidable but sometimes even desirable, both as a source of alternative ideas and
as a site for discussion about community definition and creative innovation. Accordingly,
instead of trying to stifle legal conflict either
through a reimposition of territorialist prerogative or through universalist harmonization
schemes, communities might seek (and increasingly are creating) a wide variety of procedural mechanisms and institutions for managing,
without eliminating, pluralism. Such mechanisms and institutions may help mediate conflicts by recognizing that multiple communities may legitimately wish to assert their norms
over a given act or actor, seeking ways of reconciling competing norms, and deferring to
other approaches if possible. Moreover, when
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deference is impossible (because some instances
of legal pluralism are repressive, violent, and/or
profoundly illiberal), procedures for managing
pluralism can at least require an explanation.
Although it is beyond the scope of this review to engage in a more detailed discussion of
the many such procedural mechanisms and institutions for managing pluralism currently in
place,5 the crucial antecedent point is that, although people may never reach agreement on
norms, they may at least acquiesce in procedures that take pluralism seriously, rather than
ignoring it through assertions of territorially
based power or dissolving it through universalist imperatives. Processes for managing pluralism seek to preserve the spaces of opportunity
for contestation and local variation that legal
pluralists have long documented, and therefore
a focus on pluralism may be both normatively
preferable and more practical precisely because
agreement on substantive norms is so difficult.

CONCLUSION
Although legal pluralism (and pluralist scholarship) is clearly not new, only in recent years
has pluralism come to be used as a framework

for conceptualizing the multiple conflicting jurisdictional assertions (both state and nonstate)
that characterize the global legal arena. By
studying the many local settings in which the
norms of multiple communities—geographical,
ethnic, national, and epistemic—become operative, scholars can gain a far more nuanced understanding of the international and transnational legal terrain. This is a world in which
claims to coercive power, abstract notions of
legitimacy, and arguments about legal authority are only part of an ongoing conversation,
not the final determining factors. It is a world
in which jurisgenerative practices flower, creating opportunities for contestation and creative
adaptation. And although we may not like all the
norms being articulated at any given moment,
it will do no good to ignore them or to insist on
their lack of authority. In a plural world, law is
an ongoing process of articulation, adaptation,
rearticulation, absorption, resistance, deployment, and on and on. It is a process that never
ends, and international law scholars would do
well to study the multiplicity and engage in the
conversation, rather than impose a top-down
framework that cannot help but distort the astonishing variety of law on the ground.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
The author is not aware of any affiliations, memberships, funding, or financial holdings that might
be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.
LITERATURE CITED
Ahdieh RB. 2004. Between dialogue and decree: international review of national courts. N. Y. Univ. Law Rev.
79.6:2029–163
Ahdieh RB. 2006. Dialectical regulation. Conn. Law Rev. 38.5:863–928
Baylis E. 2007. Parallel courts in post-conflict Kosovo. Yale J. Int. Law 32.1:1–60
Benda-Beckmann F. 1997. Citizens, strangers, and indigenous peoples: conceptual politics and legal pluralism.
Law Anthropol. 9:1–42
Benda-Beckmann F. 2002. Who’s afraid of legal pluralism? J. Plur. Unoff. Law 47:37–82
Benda-Beckmann K. 2001. Transnational dimensions of legal pluralism. In Begegnung und Konflict: eine kulturanthropologische Bestandsaufnahme, ed. W Fikentscher, pp. 33–48. Munich: Bayer. Akad. Wiss.
Benhabib S. 2008. Another Cosmopolitanism. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. 224 pp.
Berman PS. 2002. The globalization of jurisdiction. Pa. Law Rev. 151:311–533
5

I provide a more detailed discussion of the descriptive and normative aspects of global legal pluralism in Berman (2007) and

Berman (2010).
www.annualreviews.org • The New Legal Pluralism

239

ANRV392-LS05-11

ARI

24 September 2009

19:10

Berman PS. 2005. From international law to law and globalization. Columbia J. Transnatl. Law 43.2:485–556
Berman PS. 2006. Seeing beyond the limits of international law. Review of The Limits of International Law by
Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner. Tex. Law Rev. 84.5:1265–306
Berman PS. 2007. Global legal pluralism. South. Calif. Law Rev. 80.6:1155–238
Berman PS. 2008. Federalism and international law through the lens of legal pluralism. Mo. Law Rev. 73.4:1149–
84
Berman PS. 2010. Law Beyond Borders: Jurisprudence for a Hybrid World. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ.
Press. In press
Bhagwati J. 1996. The demands to reduce domestic diversity among trading nations. Fair Trade Harmon. 1:9
Bhala R. 1998/1999. The myth about stare decisis and international trade law (part one of a trilogy). Am. Univ.
Int. Law Rev. 14.4:845–956
Burke-White WW. 2004. International legal pluralism. Mich. J. Int. Law 25.4:963–79
Burke-White WW. 2008. Proactive complementarity: the International Criminal Court and national courts
in the Rome system of international justice. Harvard Int. Law J. 49.1:53–108
Chander A. 2001. Diaspora bonds. N. Y. Univ. Law Rev. 76.4:1005–99
Cover RM. 1981. The uses of jurisdictional redundancy: interest, ideology, and innovation. William Mary Law
Rev. 22.4:639–82
Cover RM. 1983. The Supreme Court, 1982 term—foreword: nomos and narrative. Harvard Law Rev. 97.1:4–
68
Cover R. 1992. The folktales of justice: tales of jurisdiction. In Narrative, Violence, and the Law: The Essays of
Robert Cover, ed. M Minow, M Ryan, A Sarat, pp. 173–201. Ann Arbor: Univ. Mich. Press
Dane P. 1991. The maps of sovereignty: a meditation. Cardozo Law Rev. 12.3/4:959–1006
de Sousa Santos B. 1987. Law: a map of misreading. Towards a postmodern conception of law. J. Law Soc.
14.3:279–99
de Sousa Santos B. 2002. Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization, and Emancipation. London:
Butterworths LexisNexis
de Sousa Santos B, Rodriguez Garavito CA. 2005. Law and Globalization from Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan
Legality. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
de Vattel E. 1797. The Law of Nations; Or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of
Nations and Sovereigns. Dublin: L. White
Dezalay Y, Garth BG. 1996. Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the Construction of a
Transnational Legal Order. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press. 354 pp.
Dickinson LA. 2003. The dance of complementarity: relationships among domestic, international, and transnational accountability mechanisms in East Timor and Indonesia. In Accountability for Atrocities: National
and International Responses, ed. J Stromseth, pp. 319–74. Ardsley, NY: Transnational
Dickinson LA. 2010. Outsourcing War and Peace. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press
Dinwoodie GB. 2000. A new copyright order: why national courts should create global norms. Univ. Pa. Law
Rev. 149.2:469–580
Ehrlich E. 1936 (1962). Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law, transl. WL Moll. New York: Russell &
Russell
Ellickson RC. 1991. Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press.
316 pp.
Engel D. 1980. Legal pluralism in an American community: perspectives on a civil trial court. Am. Bar Found.
Res. J. 1980.3:425–54
Ewick P, Silbey SS. 1998. The Common Place of Law: Stories from Everyday Life. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press.
336 pp.
Figgis JN. 1913. Churches in the Modern State. London: Longmans, Green. 265 pp.
Finnemore M, Sikkink K. 1998. International norm dynamics and political change. Int. Organ. 52.3:887–917
Fitzpatrick P. 1984. Law and societies. Osgoode Hall Law J. 22.1:115–38
Fuller LL. 1968. Anatomy of the Law. New York: Praeger
Galanter M. 1981. Justice in many rooms: courts, private ordering, and indigenous law. J. Legal Plur. Unoff.
Law 19.1:1–47
240

Berman

ANRV392-LS05-11

ARI

24 September 2009

19:10

Gillette CP. 2004. The law merchant in the modern age: institutional design and international usages under
the CISG. Chicago J. Int. Law 5.1:157–79
Goodman R, Jinks D. 2004. How to influence states: socialization and international human rights law. Duke
Law J. 54.3:621–704
Griffiths J. 1986. What is legal pluralism? J. Legal Plur. Unoff. Law 24:1–50
Hooker MB. 1975. Legal Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and Neo-Colonial Laws. Oxford: Clarendon.
601 pp.
Janis MW. 2003. An Introduction to International Law. New York: Aspen. 384 pp. 4th ed.
Jolls C, Sunstein C, Thaler R. 1998. A behavioral approach to law and economics. Stanford Law Rev. 50.5:1471–
550
Jones WK. 1994. A theory of social norms. Univ. Ill. Law Rev. 1994.3:545–96
Kidder RL. 1979. Toward an integrated theory of imposed law. In The Imposition of Law, ed. SB Burman, BE
Harrell-Bond, pp. 289–306. New York: Academic
Kingsbury B. 1998. Confronting difference: the puzzling durability of Gentili’s combination of pragmatic
pluralism and normative judgment. Am. J. Int. Law 92.4:713–23
Koh HH. 1996. Transnational legal process. Neb. Law Rev. 75:181–207
Koh HH. 1997. Why do nations obey international law? Yale Law J. 106:2599–659
Koh HH. 1998. Bringing international law home. Houst. Law Rev. 35:623–81
Koh HH. 1999. How is international human rights law enforced? Indiana Law J. 74:1397–417
Koskenniemi M. 2006. Fragmentation of international law: difficulties arising from the diversification
and expansion of international law. In Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-Eighth Session,
pp. 400–18. Geneva: UN Publ.
Krisch N. 2008. The open architecture of European human rights law. Mod. Law Rev. 71.2:183–216
Laski H. 1919. Authority in the Modern State. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press
Levit JK. 2005. A bottom-up approach to international lawmaking: the tale of three trade finance instruments.
Yale Int. Law Rev. 30.1:125–209
Macaulay S. 1963. Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary study. Am. Sociol. Rev. 28:55–67
Maitland FW. 1936. Trust and corporation. In Maitland: Selected Essays, ed. HD Hazeltine, G Lapsley, PH
Winfield, pp. 141–222. London: Cambridge Univ. Press
Malinowski B. 1926. Crime and Custom in Savage Society. New York: Harcourt, Brace
Mann FA. 1984. The Doctrine of International Jurisdiction Revisited After Twenty Years. The Hague: M. Nijhoff
Merry SE. 1988. Legal pluralism. Law Soc. Rev. 22:869–96
Merry SE. 2007. International law and sociolegal scholarship: towards a spatial global legal pluralism. Stud.
Law Polit. Soc. 41:149–68
Merry SE, Goodale M. 2007. The Practice of Human Rights: Tracking Law Between the Local and the Global. New
York: Cambridge Univ. Press. 396 pp.
Merry SE, Stern RE. 2005. The female inheritance movement in Hong Kong: theorizing the local/global
interface. Curr. Anthropol. 46:387–410
Moore SF. 1973. Law and social change: the semi-autonomous social field as an appropriate subject of study.
Law Soc. Rev. 7.4:719–46
Moore SF. 1986. Legal systems of the world. In Law and the Social Sciences, ed. L Lipson, S Wheeler, pp. 11–62.
New York: Russell Sage Found.
Morrall JB. 1980. Political Thought in Medieval Times. Toronto: Univ. Toronto Press. 152 pp. 7th ed.
Nadelmann EA. 1990. Global prohibition regimes: the evolution of norms in international society. Int. Organ.
44.4:479–526
Nader L. 2002. The Life of the Law: Anthropological Projects. Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press. 275 pp.
Osofsky H. 2007. Climate change litigation as pluralist legal dialogue? Stanford J. Int. Law 43:181–237
Osofsky HM, Levit JK. 2008. The scale of networks? Local climate change coalitions. Chicago J. Int. Law
8.2:409–36
Posner EA, Sunstein C. 2006. The law of other states. Stanford Law Rev. 59:131–79
Pospisil L. 1981. Modern and traditional administration of justice in New Guinea. J. Legal Plur. Unoff. Law
19:93–116
www.annualreviews.org • The New Legal Pluralism

241

ANRV392-LS05-11

ARI

24 September 2009

19:10

Rajagopal B. 2003. International Law from Below Development, Social Movements, and Third World Resistance.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press. 343 pp.
Rajagopal B. 2005. The role of law in counter-hegemonic globalization and global legal pluralism: lessons
from the Narmada Valley struggle in India. Leiden J. Int. Law 18.3:345–87
Resnik J. 2006. Law’s migration: American exceptionalism, silent dialogues, and federalism’s multiple ports of
entry. Yale Law J. 115.7:1564–1670
Resnik J. 2008a. Foreign as domestic affairs: rethinking horizontal federalism and foreign affairs preemption
in light of translocal internationalism. Emory Law J. 57.1:31–92
Resnik J. 2008b. Law as affiliation: “foreign” law, democratic federalism, and the sovereigntism of the nationstate. Int. J. Const. Law 6.1:33–66
Resnik J. 2008c. The internationalism of American federalism: Missouri and Holland. Missouri Law Rev.
73.4:1105–47
Sands P. 2001. Turtles and torturers: the transformation of international law. N. Y. Univ. J. Int. Law Polit.
33.2:527–59
Singer PW. 2003. Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press.
330 pp.
Sunder M. 2003. Piercing the veil. Yale Law J. 112:1399–472
Tamanaha BZ. 1993. The folly of legal pluralism. J. Law Soc. 20:192–217
Tamanaha BZ. 2000. A non-essentialist version of legal pluralism. J. Law Soc. 27.2:296–321
Tamanaha BZ. 2008. Understanding legal pluralism: past to present, local to global. Syd. Law Rev. 30.3:375–411
Teubner G. 1993. Law as an Autopoietic System, ed. Z Bankowski, transl. A Bankowska, R Adler. Cambridge,
UK: Blackwell. 256 pp.
Teubner G. 1997. Global Bukowina: legal pluralism in the world society. In Global Law Without a State, ed.
G. Teubner, pp. 3–28. Brookfield: Dartmouth
Trujillo E. 2007. Shifting paradigms of parochialism: lessons for international trade law. J. Int. Law Int. Relat.
3.2:41–56
Ullmann W. 1969. The Medieval Idea of Law. New York: Barnes & Noble
Vanderlinden J. 1989. Return to legal pluralism: twenty years later. J. Legal Plur. Unoff. Law 28:149–57
von Gierke OF. 1934. Natural Law and the Theory of Society, 1500 to 1800. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ.
Press
von Gierke OF, Heiman G. 1977. Associations and Law: The Classical and Early Christian Stages. Toronto: Univ.
Toronto Press
Weber M. 1954. Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press
Weisbrod C. 1980. The Boundaries of Utopia. New York: Pantheon Books. 297 pp.
Weisbrod C. 1999. Fusion folk: a comment on law and music. Cardozo Law Rev. 20.6:1439–58
Weisbrod C. 2002. Emblems of Pluralism: Cultural Differences and the State. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ.
Press. 232 pp.
Weyrauch WO, Bell MA. 1993. Autonomous lawmaking: the case of the “Gypsies.” Yale Law J. 103.2:323–400

242

Berman

